and by D'Alembert's principle Dt (H) is the axis of the resultant couple formed by transferring to O all the external forces.
12. The last theorem includes Euler's equations, and the different extensions which those have of late received. I have attempted to show that, in solving mechanical problems, the above theorem will be generally found more useful than any of those equations. Moreover, it serves to explain the geometrical reason, independently of Euler's equations, why the results are so much simplified in the case of two of the principal moments of inertia being equal to one another.
13. In order to illustrate how advantageously and how completely the most complicated formulae of dynamics may be interpreted, I have given a direct analytical proof of Euler's equations, and have then shown that the consideration of each step of the analytical work leads to an extremely short demonstration of the same equations by means of the theory of the differential coefficients and determinants of lines.
XV. " On the Theory of Probabilities." By George B oole, Esq., E.R.S. Received May 21, 1862.
(Abstract.)
This paper has for its object the investigation of the general analy tical conditions of a method for the solution of questions in the Theory of Probabilities, which was published in a work entitled " An Investigation of the Laws of Thought, &c." * The application of the method to particular problems has been A correspondence on the subject between Mr. Cayley and myself also appears in the current (M ay) Number of the ' Philosophical Magazine,' and I owe it to Mr. Cayley th at these further researches, o f the results of which an account will here be given, were under taken.
I shall make but few remarks here upon the a 'priori grounds of the method. Generally it may be said that the solution of a question in the Theory of Probabilities depends upon the possibility of men tally constructing the problem from hypotheses which appear, whether as a consequence of our knowledge or as a consequence of our igno rance, to be simple and independent. W hen the data are the proba bilities of simple events, and no conditions are added, the problem is in theory sufficiently easy, the sole difficulty consisting in the calcu lation of complex combinations. But when the data are the proba bilities of compound events, or when the events are connected by absolute conditions expressible in logical propositions, or when both these circumstances are present, the difficulty of the required mental construction becomes greater. If we assume the independence of the simple events from which the compound events according to their expression in language are formed, we meet, first, the difficulty that the number of equations thus formed may be greater or less than that which is requisite to obtain a solution; and, secondly, the far more fundamental difficulty that the conditions under which the solution, supposing it to be obtained, is analytically valid may not coincide with the conditions under which the data are possible. I t seems indeed likely at any rate the evidence of particular examples points uniformly to the conclusion-that any attempts to construct the pro blem upon hypotheses which, while not involved in the actual data are of the same nature as those data (i. e. which might conceivably have resulted as facts of observation from the same experience from which the data were derived), limit the problem, and lead to solutions which are analytically valid under conditions narrower than those under which the data are possible.
But the processes of mathematical logic enable us, without any addition to the actual data, to effect the required construction of the problem formally--formally because the hypotheses which are re garded as ultimate and independent in that construction refer to an ideal state of things. The nature of .the conceptions employed, and their connexion with the conceptions involved in the actual statement of the problem, are discussed in the paper. I t is sufficient to say here that, whatever difficulty there may be in these conceptions as conceptions, there is nothing arbitrary in the formal procedure of thought with which they are connected. The probabilities of the ideal events enter as auxiliary quantities into the process of solution, and disappear by elimination from the final result, but they are throughout treated as probabilities, and combined according to the laws of probabilities. I will only say here that the difficulty which has been felt in the conception of the ideal events appears to me to arise from a misdirected attempt to conceive those events by means of the events in the statement of the problem-the true order of thought being that the events in the statement of the problem are, not indeed in their material character, but as subjects of probability and of relations affecting probability, to be conceived by means of the ideal events. Now the probabilities which constitute the actual data will in gene ral be subject to conditions in order that they may be derived from actual experience. Those conditions admit of mathematical expres sion.
Generally, if the events in the data are all or any of them compound, and tip v p 2, . . . p n represent their probabilities, those be subject to certain conditions, expressible in the form of linear equations or inequations, beside the condition that, as representing probabilities, they must be positive proper fractions. a system of inferior limits expressed by linear functions of the other quantities, and a system of superior limits also so expressed.
Thus, if A, B, C represent any simple events, and if represent the probability of the concurrence of B and C, p2 that of the concur rence of C and A, p 3 that of the concurrence of A and B, th must, in order that they may be derived from experience, satisfy the conditions
Pi
P^P i+ P x -h iV>ih+J>2 -1, as well as the conditions implied in their being positive proper frac tions.
On the other hand, the ideal events being by hypothesis simple and independent, the auxiliary quantities which represent their proba bilities will be subject to no other condition a priori than that of being positive proper fractions-to no other condition a priori, because their actual values are determined in the process of solution.
Now the most general results of the analytical investigation are1st. That the auxiliary quantities representing the probabilities of the ideal events admit of determination as positive proper fractions, and, further, of a single definite determination as such, precisely when the original data supply the conditions of a possible experience.
2ndly. That as a consequence of this the probability sought will always lie within such limits as it would have had if determined by actual observation from the same experience as the data.
The proof of these propositions rests upon certain general theorems relating to the solution of a class of simultaneous algebraic equations, and, auxiliary to this, to the properties of a functional determinant.
The following are the principal of those theorems 1st. If the elements of any symmetrical determinant are all of them linear homogeneous functions of certain quantities av . . . ar if the coefficients of these quantities in the terms on the principal diagonal of the determinant are all positive-and if, lastly, the coeffi cients of any of these quantities in any row of elements are propor tional to the corresponding coefficients of the same quantity in any other row, then the determinant developed as a rational and integral function of the quantities av a2, . . . ar will consist wholly of positive terms.
And, as a deduction from the above, 2ndly. If Y be a rational and entire function of any quantities x X i t ,.
Xn) involving, however, no powers of those quantities, and all the coefficients being constant, and if in general V, represent the sum of those terms in V which contain xi as a factor, and Vy-the sum of those terms in V which contain the product x-t xJ} then the 
. +hPn+tr^Q-
In the application to the theory of probabilities, the form of the function Y depends upon the explicitly determined logical connexion of the events in the d ata; the equations or inequations of condition correspond to the conditions of possible experience as a source of the data.
It appears, therefore, that, quite independently of any question of the validity of the logical, and I ought perhaps to add philosophical, grounds of the method, it is a perfect method of interpolation. The analytical investigation, however, shows that, for the mere purpose of interpolation, the process might be modified by altering the coefficients of Y without affecting its form ; but it indicates at the same time that such modifications have no definite analogy with that process by which weight is assigned to astronomical observations, and, from their arbi trary character, lead to results which cannot properly be regarded as expressions of probability in any sense/ XYI. " On Simultaneous Differential Equations in which the number of Yariables exceeds by more than unity the number of the Equations." B y George B oole, Esq., E.R.S. Received June 19, 1862, (Abstract.) This paper contains the proof, with some applications, of a method described in a paper bearing nearly the same title which was pub lished in the ' Proceedings of the Royal Society ' for March 6, 1862. The following paper is a continuation of the two preceding Memoirs on the same subject. It has a fourfold object. In the first place, I calculate the general values of the coefficients in the Binomial Theorem given in the first Memoir. In the next place, I give an expression for the form of the coefficient of the general term of the multinomial theorem as previously explained. I then give a theorem for the multiplication of symbolical factors emanating from each other after a given law ; and lastly, I investigate a binomial theorem, reciprocal to the binomial theorem already considered.
